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It is striking to see the extent to which articles that preceded theFukushima crisis had unanimously considered nuclear power an insepa-rable part of China’s energy strategy. Apart from the 13 plants in oper-
ation, nearly 30 are under construction and 90 more are planned. This
strategy of accelerated nuclear development is aimed at ensuring that 15
percent of China’s energy will come from non-coal sources by 2020, with-
out disturbing the overall national power supply. After the accident in
Japan, questions have arisen in China over possible reconsideration of the
plans set for the nuclear energy sector.
Following the catastrophe in Japan, the Chinese government speedily or-
dered a halt to the examination and approval of new nuclear projects. In
Wang Jiabo’s view, this decision to put the programmes on hold and begin
a review of nuclear security was something the entire international com-
munity felt compelled to adopt. According to Wang, this action required all
the more courage and determination in China, as the government was in
the midst of urgently adopting low-carbon-emitting energy strategies.
Expert consultations and inspections of nuclear installations in Chinese
provinces following Fukushima helped formulate a general evaluation of
management systems and nuclear safety in China. In their articles, various
authors reported the views of experts and evaluators affirming a high level
of nuclear safety in China. Zhao Yongxin, Jiang Jianke, and Zhang Yujie hold
that nuclear technologies used in China are of an advanced nature, corre-
sponding to international standards. Further, they point to the rigour of the
Chinese supervision system, observing that China drew lessons from the
Chernobyl disaster and adopted surveillance systems that follow standards
set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Deng Li says that surveil-
lance procedures for measuring radioactivity as well as for evaluating the
plants and their risk levels were reinforced following Fukushima.
The authors rely largely on an analysis of China’s emergency prepared-
ness. Procedures for handling nuclear accidents consist of three levels of
response: the state, local governments, and enterprises:
- Within the State Council, 20 units of related ministries and administra-
tions form a coordination committee for emergency procedures in case of
a nuclear accident. These units are responsible for setting up and adopting
crisis-handing measures, as well as personnel training and the direction of
exercises relative to emergency situations;
- At the provincial level, the mechanisms include emergency intervention
organs and rescue teams capable of acting in terms of measuring levels of
radioactivity, protection from radiation, decontamination procedures,
medical treatment, etc.; 
- At the plant level, the measures include detailed regulations on proce-
dures to be followed in case of an incident, as well as teams geared for
emergency interventions. 
Deng Li’s analysis of Zhejiang Province’s case describes a network of mil-
itary authorities, groups of local experts, and government officials – each
armed with an emergency mechanism to deal with nuclear accidents – as
well as materials such as reserves of iodine or perhaps decontamination
vehicles. Nevertheless, according to Zhan Chen, director of the environ-
mental protection bureau in Zhejiang Province, emergency procedures
need further improvement. Zhan points to the lack of technical experts
and the need to train crisis management teams. Further, inter-province co-
ordination needs to be improved, as well as coordination among systems
for prior warning, meteorology, seismology, and oceanography. 
Despite the questions raised by the Fukushima accident, renouncing nu-
clear energy is clearly not in the cards for China. Zhao, Jiang, and Zhang say
that in a context of worldwide energy shortage and global warming, nu-
clear energy is an ineluctable strategic choice for China. They consider nu-
clear energy development imperative for economic development and im-
proving people’s living standards. According to the authors of the People’s
Daily article, nuclear power enjoys advantages that place it above other
energy sources: It is an affordable and efficient means of producing elec-
tricity. It is also viable, given the maturity of technologies used. Compared
with wind, solar, and other new sources, nuclear energy has another advan-
tage that cannot be ignored: it can supply stable power of great quantity
and quality, making it indispensable for the scale of China’s needs. As for
carbon emissions, nuclear plants win hands down compared with tradi-
tional energy sources. In this context, People’s Daily notes the targets set
in the 12th Five-Year Plan for greater attention to energy needs and envi-
ronmental protection: reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 17 percent by
2015 compared with 2010, reducing sulphur dioxide by 8 percent; increas-
ing the use of non-fossil fuels in energy production from 8.3 percent in
2010 to 11.4 percent in 2015, etc. The authors say that without nuclear
energy, it would be impossible to attain these targets.
Alongside grand national orientations positioning nuclear power as a pil-
lar of China’s energy strategy, local governments and energy companies
have likewise shown unbridled enthusiasm for nuclear production. Deng Li
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considers the question of whether such zeal for this energy source on the
part of local authorities is not exaggerated. These authorities have demon-
strated a real desire to be at the cutting edge of China’s nuclear pro-
gramme (核電站的選址“打破頭”- hedianzhan de xuanzhi dapotou). It is
also a major strategy given the objective of reducing energy intensity that
has been imposed on them. Nuclear energy development has thus
emerged as a major bulwark of the strategy for reducing energy consump-
tion in provinces or municipalities such as Chongqing. Nuclear energy de-
velopment plans represent an assurance of energy supply for local govern-
ments, but they also constitute a source of considerable revenue, jobs, and
GDP growth… Local enterprises see in nuclear energy programmes an op-
portunity to invest billions of yuan and to be assured of stable revenue
yield (compared with renewable energy). Deng Li concludes that the level
of interest shown by Chinese provinces for nuclear programmes is there-
fore hardly surprising.
The latest nuclear energy development programme (1) set production ca-
pacity at 40 billion GW in 2020. Going by estimates of projects already un-
derway, China’s nuclear capacity will have surpassed that target by 2020.
Discussions in the National People’s Congress preceding the 12th Plan’s
publication had spoken of doubling the capacity to 80 GW in 2020. 
Some of the 90 new plants currently in the pipeline are close to drinking
water sources, and experts have raised doubts over the degree of risk for
localities. Li Ganjie, director of the department of nuclear safety, warns
that a number of enterprises and local governments have shown too much
enthusiasm for nuclear energy: “The targets set are overambitious, and ac-
tions taken have been too hasty and lack realism or expertise, thus raising
risks not only over safety but also over economic viability.”
Li Ganjie says the greatest challenge faced by China’s nuclear programme
is a lack of competent human resources in the technological domain. The
speed and scale at which China’s nuclear projects have developed could
well lead to a dilution and disorganisation of technically competent per-
sonnel. This could have consequences not only for the projects currently
underway but also for future plants. Furthermore, a lack of competent
technicians could hurt China badly in the event of a nuclear accident, as
would a dispersal of crisis management machinery among multiple ill-co-
ordinated entities.
Despite these risks and drawbacks, the authors agree that in respect of
nuclear energy development, China has simply no choice. The People’s
Daily authors conclude that “China’s nuclear programme won’t stop gorg-
ing itself for fear of choking” (在發展核電問題上，不應因噎廢食 - zai fazhan
hedian wenti shang, buying yinyefeishi).
z Translated by N. Jayaram
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1. The nuclear energy development programme 2005-2020 (核電中長期發展規劃 - hedian zhongchangqi
fazhan guihua) was launched by the NDRC in 2007, setting the objectives for development to be
achieved by 2020.
